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ROGUE BASE STATION DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
 
Abstract 
User equipment (UE) and cellular networks implement one or more techniques to detect and 
mitigate rogue base stations/cells.  In one approach, a UE implements base station authentication 
techniques for detecting and mitigating rogue base stations.  In this approach, the UE detects a 
failed authentication procedure and determines the associated base station is a rogue base station.  
The UE stores identifying information associated with the rogue base station and location 
information associated with the UE.  Upon attachment with a legitimate base station/cell, the UE 
sends the identifying information and location information to the network.  In another example, the 
network implements reverse mobility detection techniques for detecting and mitigating rogue base 
stations.  In this approach, static mobile UEs are located throughout the network and monitor signal 
strength variations associated with cells for detecting rogue base stations.  In yet another approach, 
a UE is configured to detect when a base station is attempting to downgrade the UE to a lower order 
radio access technology (RAT) and identifies the base station as a rogue base station.  In a further 
approach, a UE is configured to determine when a received signal strength indicator (RSSI) is 
abnormally high, indicating that a rogue base station is using a signal-jamming mechanism.  
Background 
Rogue base stations are standalone devices that mimic legitimate base stations in a cellular network.  
A rogue base station intends to have user equipment (UE) connect to the rogue base station rather 
than a legitimate base station.  Rogue base stations are not connected to the core network and 
typically operate by mimicking the cell identifier (ID), frequency of operation, mobile country code 
(MCC), mobile network code, etc., of a legitimate base station.  Rogue base stations often transmit 
at a much higher power than a legitimate base station.  Therefore, a UE may unintentionally connect 
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to a rogue base station since UEs are typically configured to connect to the base station with the 
strongest signal. 
Once a UE is connected to a rogue base station, the rogue base station can perform various 
malicious acts.  For example, private information of the UE, such as the international mobile 
subscriber identity (IMSI), can be exposed to the rogue base station since the UE typically sends 
this information to the network before authentication and security procedures are in place.  
Therefore, the rogue base station can intercept, decode, and alter communications from the UE 
before they are encrypted.  In another example, the rogue base station can capture signaling 
messages sent by the UE over the air before encryption.  Since the signaling messages are captured 
before being encrypted, the rogue base station can use, for example, standard Abstract Syntax 
Notation (ASN) to decode the messages.  After the messages are decoded, the rogue base station 
can extract UE specific information such as the IMSI of the UE.  The rogue base station may also 
attempt to downgrade the UE to a lower order Radio Access Technology (RAT) with lesser security 
mechanisms.  As such, rogue base stations result in critical security concerns for a cellular network, 
financial loss for network operators, negative user experience, and so on. 
Description 
As described below, rogue base stations (cells) can be detected and mitigated (e.g., barred) using 
UE-based and network-based approaches, individually or in combination.  These approaches, which 
can be implemented in various scenarios, include base station authentication techniques, rogue base 
station detection using reverse mobility techniques, detection and prevention of network/RAT 
downgrade attacks, and detection of signal jamming mechanisms.   
For example, a first scenario is directed to a cell selection situation where a UE powers on in a 
rogue base station coverage area.  In this example, a UE identifies cells, which may be legitimate 
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cells or rogue cells, during an initial scan.  The UE selects the cell having the strongest signal.  
Rogue base stations are typically configured to transmit at higher power than neighboring legitimate 
base stations to increase the likelihood that a UE will connect to the rogue base station rather than a 
legitimate base station.  The UE checks the public land mobile network (PLMN) code sent by the 
base station to a subscriber identity module (SIM) PLMN code.  If the PLMN codes match, the UE 
checks the S-criteria for cell selection.  Assuming the rogue base station is transmitting at a higher 
power than the legitimate base station, the cell selection passes on the rogue cell, and the UE 
proceeds to camp thereon.  The UE initiates an attach procedure during which the UE may send its 
identity before an authentication procedure is performed, thereby enabling the rogue base station to 
capture unencrypted UE information, such as IMSI, international mobile equipment identity (IMEI), 
and so on.  As such, a user’s private data can be stolen by the rogue base station and used to 
perform illegal activities.  
A second scenario is directed to a cell reselection situation.  In this situation, a UE device, which is 
already in idle mode and camped on a legitimate cell, comes near and identifies a rogue cell.  The 
UE determines that the rogue cell has a better cell strength than the legitimate cell and may reselect 
to the rogue cell.  Cell reselection is an autonomous process performed by the UE without any 
network intervention.  In a Fourth Generation (4G) Long-Term Evolution (LTE) network, the UE 
may initiate a tracking area update procedure.  As part of this procedure, the UE may expose 
information specific to the UE that is captured by the rogue base station of the cell.  Hackers can 
then use the captured information to extract personal information.  As such, a user’s private data can 
be stolen by the rogue base station and used to perform illegal activities.   
A third scenario is directed to a handover situation.  In this situation, a UE is in a connected state, 
identifies an intra-frequency rogue cell, and sends a measurement report to the network.  The 
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network configures intra-frequency measurements for handover/mobility.  If the rogue base station 
is transmitting in the same E-UTRA Absolute Radio Frequency Channel Number (EARFCN) as a 
legitimate base station, the UE may report the cell ID of the rogue base station along with the 
RSRP.  If the cell ID is known to the legitimate base station, a handover may occur to the rogue 
base station.  In at least some instances, the authentication may already be enabled during handover, 
so the rogue base station may not decode the UE information.  However, the UE will lose its 
connection to the network when the UE connects to the rogue base station.  Therefore, the user will 
experience a service interruption.  
One approach for detecting and mitigating rogue base stations is shown below in Figure 1.  In this 
approach, base station authentication techniques are implemented for detecting and mitigating rogue 
base stations.  For example, an LTE or other standard-based network provides a robust 
authentication mechanism that will authenticate both the UE and network.  The authentication 
procedure takes place each time the UE powers on and attempts to attach to the network.  Once the 
authentication procedure is successfully completed, both the UE and the network can assume each 
other are legitimate entities.  However, the input to the authentication procedure is the ID of the UE, 
such as the IMSI or IMEI.  This information is typically sent by the UE before the authentication 
and security procedures are performed.  For example, an identity procedure is performed before 
authentication.  As part of the identity procedure, the network sends an identity request to the UE, 
and the UE responds with an identity response, which includes the UE ID.   
A rogue base station mimics this process by sending the Identity request to the UE and captures the 
UE’s response.  The rogue base station may or may not respond with an authentication procedure.  
In either case, the authentication procedure fails when the base station is a rogue base station.  
Therefore, once the UE sends an identity response to a base station and the authentication procedure 
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subsequently fails, the UE determines the base station is a rogue base station (cell) and does not 
camp on the cell until the next power cycle.  The UE can store its Global Positioning System (GPS) 
coordinates and information, such as the cell ID, EARFCN, and PLMN ID, associated with the 
failed rogue base station, in a rogue base station/cell list.  Therefore, the next time the UE detects a 
cell, the UE can compare one or more of the GPS coordinates, cell ID, EARFCN, PLMN ID of the 
cell to corresponding information in the rogue base station/cell list.  If matching information is 
found in the rogue base station list, the UE determines the cell is a rogue base station and does not 
camp on the cell. 
Upon detection of a failed cell, the UE continues to select any other cell.  If the UE can complete a 
successful authentication procedure on a new (legitimate) cell and attach to it, the UE notifies the 
network of the detected rogue base station(s).  For example, the UE can send information associated 
with the rogue base station (e.g., GPS coordinates, the cell ID, EARFCN, PLMN ID, etc.) to the 
network.  The UE can send the rogue base station information to the network through a signaling 
message or another mechanism.  Alternatively, the UE can update a cloud server of the carrier with 
the rogue base station information.  The carrier and law enforcement can then take appropriate 
action on the rogue base station information based on, for example, the GPS coordinates provided 
by the UE.  In some instances, law enforcement may deploy base stations to capture criminals.  
These devices can be whitelisted so that the UE does not flag them as rogue base stations.     
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Figure 1 
A second approach for detecting and mitigating rogue base stations is shown below in Figure 2.  In 
this approach, reverse mobility techniques are implemented to detect and mitigate rogue base 
stations.  Legitimate base stations are typically static, while UEs are generally mobile.  Rogue base 
stations can also be mobile to capture the information of as many UEs as possible.  For example, 
rogue base stations can be installed on the top of a vehicle.  The vehicle can be driven across the 
network to capture the details of many UEs.  Mobile rogue base stations can be detected and 
mitigated by installing static UEs in several locations throughout the network, such as in operator 
stores.  An application can be installed on the static UEs that monitors signal strength variations of 
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detected cells.  Wide variations in signal RSRP or Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) is not 
expected from a well-planned legitimate base station.  However, since a mobile rogue base station 
moves across the network, wide variations in signal RSRP or RSSI can be expected.  As such, the 
application performs statistical analysis (e.g., mean, standard deviation, etc.) of signal 
characteristics, such as signal strength, using machine learning.  If sudden or unexpected variations 
are detected, the static UE determines a mobile rogue base station is nearby.  The static UE 
determines identifying information of the rogue base station, such as the cell ID, PLMN ID, MCC, 
MNC, etc.  The static UE can send the identifying information along with the static UE's GPS 
coordinates to the network and law enforcement authorities so that the rogue base station can be 
located and shut down.  The static UE can also share the time plot of signal variations since the 
peak of the plot indicates the time when the rogue base station was close to the static UE.   
In another example, a network-based algorithm or technique can be implanted that configures all 
base stations to periodically update/send their GPS location to a network server.  If one or more 
network components detect a large change in a base station’s location, this base station is identified 
as a rogue base station.  In some instances, small changes in a base station's location are filtered out 
to compensate for small cells.   
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Figure 2 
A third approach for detecting and mitigating rogue base stations is shown below in Figure 3.  In 
this approach, network/RAT downgrade attacks are detected and prevented.  Networks such as 2G 
(Second Generation), GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications), and 1x networks are less 
secure than 4G/5G (Fifth Generation) networks.  As such, rogue base stations attempt to push UEs 
to a lower order RAT.  Rogue base stations can typically capture more UE information on a lower 
order RAT due to its lesser security.  For example, a rogue base station can implement multiple 
RATs such as LTE and 2G RATs.  When a UE camps on the rogue base station using the LTE 
RAT, the rogue base station manipulates the cell reselection parameters (e.g., 
CellReselectionPriority and reselection thresholds) so that the UE reselects to the 2G RAT of the 
rogue base station.  However, legitimate base stations typically assign higher priority to LTE/5G 
over 2G.  As such, a UE can be configured to detect when the base station reverses priority and 
instructs the UE to reselect to a lower order RAT.   
When the UE detects that the base station is instructing the UE to reselect to a lower order RAT, the 
UE identifies the base station as a rogue base station, and the UE does not camp on the cell until the 
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next power cycle.  The UE can store its Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates and 
information associated with the failed rogue base station, such as the cell ID, EARFCN, and PLMN 
ID, in a rogue base station list.  Therefore, the next time the UE detects a cell, the UE can compare 
one or more of the GPS coordinates, cell ID, EARFCN, PLMN ID of the cell to corresponding 
information in the rogue base station list.  If matching information is found in the rogue base station 
list, the UE determines the cell is a rogue base station and does not camp on the cell.  The UE can 




A fourth approach for detecting and mitigating rogue base stations is directed to signal jamming.  
Some rogue base stations may utilize a jamming mechanism that sends a signal with very high 
power so that UEs cannot locate legitimate cells.  The jamming mechanism intends to obstruct the 
communications between UEs and the network.  Rogue base stations that utilize jamming 
mechanisms are typically not real base stations but are just signal generators that transmit high 
power signals in the same frequency spectrum as legitimate base stations.  As such, a UE can be 
configured to detect abnormally high RSSI, which indicates a jamming mechanism is being used on 
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the band.  When the UE detects an abnormally high RSSI, the UE can attempt to find a legitimate 
cell on the frequency.  If the UE cannot find a legitimate cell on the frequency, the UE can move to 
a different band or different RAT.       
Use of the approaches outlined above, individually or in combination, enable network operators to 
detect rogue base stations and mitigate the security issues caused by the rogue base stations.  
Eavesdropping by a rogue base station can be reduced, thereby increasing user security and privacy.  
Modern solutions, such as machine learning and cloud-based services, can provide more robust and 
foolproof detection mechanisms that are easy to implement on the UE and network.   
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